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Is Makassar a ‘Sanctuary City’? Migration Governance in 
Indonesia After the ‘Local Turn’
Antje Missbach, Yunizar Adiputera & Atin Prabandari
► Missbach, A., Adiputera, Y., & Prabandari, A. (2018). Is Makassar a ‘sanctuary city’? Migration governance in 
Indonesia after the ‘local turn’. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 11(2), 199-216.
Taking into consideration three levels of government (regional, national, and sub-na-
tional) that potentially offer protection to refugees, this paper is concerned with changes 
initiated by the 2016 Presidential Regulation on Handling Foreign Refugees. This regula-
tion has delegated more responsibility for managing refugees to the sub-national levels of 
administration in Indonesia, which, like other nations in the Southeast Asia, has been re-
luctant to provide protection for refugees or any options for their integration into society. 
The reason for this is that, despite many vociferous demands in favor of a ‘regional solu-
tion’ in the aftermath of the 2015 Andaman Sea Crisis, most attempts ended up in abey-
ance. Following suit with the so-called ‘local turn’ in migration studies, which increased 
attention to the local dimensions of refugee protection due to the receding capacities in 
the major actors involved both in global refugee protection and international migration 
management, we direct attention to the sub-national level of refugee management in 
Indonesia using as a case study the city of Makassar, which has hitherto enjoyed a fairly 
positive reputation for welcoming refugees. By examining the current living conditions 
of asylum seekers and refugees in Makassar and comparing them to other places in Indo-
nesia, we ask whether the concept of ‘sanctuary city’ is applicable to a non-Western con-
text and, in doing so, hope to enhance current discussions of creating alternative models 
for refugee protection beyond the national and regional level.
Keywords: Indonesia; Migration Governance; Presidential Regulations; Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers; Sanctuary Cities

INTRODUCTION
An unprecedented 65.6 million people around the world at the end of 2017 have 
been forced from their homes by war and conflict, which means that the num-
ber of displaced people currently exceeds the number uprooted during World 
War II. At the end of 2016, there were close to 3.5 million refugees, 2.7 million 
internally displaced people, and more than 1.5 million stateless people in the 
Asia-Pacific region (UNHCR, 2017a). In 2016, Southeast Asia hosted a total of 
2.8 million persons of concern, including over 483,000 refugees, 68,000 asylum 
seekers, 462,000 internally displaced people (IDPs), and over 1.4 million state-
less people (UNHCR, 2018).1 Indonesia, the focus of this article, hosted less than 
1 These UNHCR statistics include figures for Bangladesh, which is not usually considered part of 
Southeast Asia.
Aktuelle Südostasienforschung  Current Research on Southeast Asia
w
w
w
.s
ea
s.
at
   
 d
oi
 1
0.
14
76
4/
10
.A
SE
A
S-
00
03
200 | ASEAS 11(2)
Is Makassar a ‘Sanctuary City’? 
14,000 asylum seekers and refugees in mid-2018, which is substantially less compared 
to its neighbours, such as Thailand and Malaysia. The majority of asylum seekers and 
refugees in Indonesia come from Afghanistan (56%), Somalia (10%), and Myanmar 
(8%). Southeast Asia has the weakest normative frameworks for refugee protection of 
any region, apart from the Middle East (Klug, 2013). Most Southeast Asian states sim-
ply never felt obliged to sign the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention) (Davies, 2008). 
The countries producing the largest numbers of refugees currently are Afghanistan, 
South Sudan, Syria, and Myanmar. Against widespread politicized perceptions of a 
‘refugee crisis’ in Europe, the United States, and Australia, the majority of displaced 
people lack the will and the means to travel long distances, tending to stay relatively 
close to their home countries. On these grounds, when critical migration scholars 
speak of the ‘global refugee crisis’, they usually mean a political crisis of compassion 
and thus tend to emphasize the lack of collective responsibility and binding com-
mitments for hosting displaced people. In light of the absence of trans-regional and 
global schemes to deal with the many challenges that displaced people face, the topic 
of so-called South-to-South hospitality has recently re-entered academic studies and 
regained attention (Pacitto & Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013). Spontaneous acts of coping 
with large inflows have raised expectations and increased the pressure for temporary 
or permanent integration of refugees and asylum seekers in countries that are usually 
not among the typically Western resettlement countries.
Particularly during so-called times of extraordinary irregular movements, such as 
the 2015 Andaman Sea crisis when thousands of Rohingya arrived in insular Southeast 
Asia by boat, politicians and humanitarian advocates issued calls for ‘regional solu-
tions’ to address the hardship of forcibly displaced people (Fontaine, 1995). Given the 
extremely low accession rate to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its associated 1967 Protocol2, the search for ‘regional solutions’ 
in Southeast Asia is tied to high hopes for alternative forms of protection that are not 
as strict as those set out in the Refugee Convention. In the aftermath of the Andaman 
Sea crisis, the combined efforts of the multilateral fora and mechanisms that were 
deployed to resolve the situation, including the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime as well as the Bali 
Declaration on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related Transnational 
Crime and its Regional Cooperation Framework, ended up in abeyance, leaving it 
rather uncertain “whether they have improved the region’s preparedness to respond 
to such events in the future” (Gleeson, 2017, p. 6).
This article seeks to contribute to the debate on regional solutions by taking 
into consideration also national, and more importantly, sub-national approaches. 
Since there is no functioning regional mechanism to deal with displaced people in 
Southeast Asia, and considerable doubt that one might ever materialize, it is neces-
sary to scrutinize the temporary admittance of displaced people into each Southeast 
Asian host country and the prevalent complementary and alternative forms of 
2 Only three out of 11 Southeast Asian states have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention: Cambodia, 
the Philippines, and Timor-Leste. It is unlikely that Indonesia will sign and ratify the Convention in the 
near future. 
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protection available for them at both national and sub-national levels.3 For this 
article, Indonesia was chosen because of its geopolitical significance within the Asia-
Pacific region. Like all but three Southeast Asian states, Indonesia is not a signatory 
to the Refugee Convention and thus not legally obliged to offer protection to refu-
gees (Tan, 2016). Out of the three durable solutions envisioned by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), only two are available for refugees in 
Indonesia: voluntary repatriation to their countries of origin and, if this is not pos-
sible, resettlement to a third country. Local integration is not a legal option so far. 
However, because of the ongoing influx of new asylum seekers, global resettlement 
fatigue, and deterrence policies in the region, de facto integration is about to happen 
in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region. 
Makassar has been chosen as a case study for this article because of its functional 
role in accommodating asylum seekers and refugees. As Indonesia’s fifth largest city, 
Makassar is often referred to as Kota Angin Mamiri (city of breeze) because of its 
seaside location.4 Also, due to its long-standing tradition as an important trade hub 
and host for a large sea-faring and migratory population, Makassar enjoys a reputa-
tion as being cosmopolitan and tolerant (Sutherland, 2011). Although Makassar had 
frequently seen the temporary stay of internally displaced people from different con-
flict areas within Indonesia, only from 2010 onwards did the city become a hub for 
foreign asylum seekers and refugees. Not only does Makassar have an immigration 
detention center (IDC), but it also has a range of community shelters. In 2011, the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) started using two hotels for housing 
asylum seekers and refugees who could not be placed in the IDC (Missbach, 2017a). 
The number of shelters has grown in recent years, with 18 available in August 2017 
for 1,158 asylum seekers and refugees (IOM, 2017). At the end of 2017, 13,840 asylum 
seekers and refugees were registered with the UNHCR all over Indonesia. Of these, 
1,838 were living in Makassar, 564 of whom languished in the IDC and other forms of 
temporary detention, despite the growing consensus among Indonesian government 
agencies that immigration detention facilities should no longer be used for housing 
refugees and asylum seekers for the long term (UNHCR, 2017b).
When measured against Makassar’s reputation as a city known for welcoming 
refugees, current developments – after the issuance of the Presidential Regulation 
No. 125/2016 that we define here as a watershed moment as it sought to formalise 
the ‘local turn’ in Indonesia – represent a dramatic deterioration in hospitality. In 
this paper we scrutinize the handling of refugees in Makassar under the premise of 
‘sanctuary cities’ – a broad term applied to cities that have policies in place designed 
to limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement actions and deportation 
and instead offer some community-driven forms of hospitality and protection – and 
ask whether any of the approaches that were developed in the United States and 
Europe are in Indonesia. Critical readers might think that this application of a con-
cept that was developed in more affluent societies onto a non-Western context is 
3 Unlike many other studies dealing with the decentralized politics of Indonesia, we define ‘local’ here 
as primarily the urban setting, rather than the province or regency, which is usually considered the main 
sub-national entity.
4 Makassar is the provincial capital of South Sulawesi, located on the southern part of Sulawesi Island. It 
is a major port city with a majority Muslim population of around 1,7 million.
202 | ASEAS 11(2)
Is Makassar a ‘Sanctuary City’? 
epistemologically naive, but to us it is of utmost (political) importance to shed light 
on how non-Western refugee hosting societies operate, as they are often ignored 
within the current global scenario. 
Whereas several authors have scrutinized the handling of refugees on a national 
level (Kneebone, 2017; Tan, 2016), we pay attention to sub-national approaches, in 
part because of the local turn expedited by the Presidential Regulation No. 125/2016. 
In this article, we argue that whereas the sanctuary city and the way it is practiced 
elsewhere (outside of Indonesia) depicts an emancipative bottom-up approach, the 
local turn in Indonesia stands primarily for a top-down approach that seeks to shift 
responsibility for refugee protection and migration management from the national 
to the sub-national level without equipping the local stakeholders or offering budget-
ary concessions. Overall, as our case study will show, the handling of asylum-seekers 
and refugees remains shaped by rightlessness, restrictions, and reprimand, despite 
a few nascent initiatives driven by the Makassar municipality and to a lesser extent 
local communities.
This article is the outcome of collaborative effort between researchers based 
in Indonesia and Australia, who have conducted interviews over more than a year, 
individually and as a team, with national and local stakeholders involved in the 
management of refugees. In 2017, the authors observed three sosialisasi (informa-
tion-sharing) events related to the implementation of Presidential Regulation No. 
125/2016 in Jakarta (one national and one provincial) and in Makassar. During sev-
eral research trips to Makassar, usually for a week at a time, the authors established 
contact with a number of asylum seekers and refugees in their community shelters 
and kept in contact with some of them through social media. This article is based 
on a variety of sources, including formal interviews with authorities and informal 
conversations with refugees, online communication via social media with selected 
informants, and Indonesian-language press reports and grey literature. The article 
is divided into three main parts: First we explain the sanctuary city concept; then, 
we introduce the Indonesian context with regard to its hosting of asylum seekers 
and refugees over protracted periods of time and particularly the changes aspired by 
the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 125/2016; and finally, we offer a detailed 
portrayal of Makassar and its local policies vis-à-vis refugees and asylum seekers. The 
theoretical lessons learnt from the research are fleshed out in a brief conclusion. 
THE ‘SANCTUARY CITY’
The concept of the sanctuary city has gained significance and popularity worldwide 
as local communities have welcomed and protected refugees and asylum seekers in 
defiance of restrictive state policies (Bauder, 2017; Darling, 2010; Hintjens & Pouri, 
2014; Nyers, 2010; Squire & Darling, 2013; Villazor, 2010). Its popularity and spread 
across several geopolitical contexts means that the concept now refers to variety of 
practices and policies, which differ substantially across different national and local 
contexts. Bauder (2017) has categorized two contesting forms of the sanctuary city 
that are worth summarizing here. The first concept derives from the United States 
context, which advocates non-cooperation with federal immigration authorities 
and challenges the mainstream discourse of citizenship and belonging, whereas the 
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second derives from the United Kingdom and is much more focused on the culture 
of hospitality, engagement, and social inclusion. 
Non-Cooperation and ‘Local Citizenship’
The sanctuary city concept originated in Berkeley, California, in 1971 to protect US 
Navy sailors who resisted the Vietnam War. City law prohibited city officials from 
assisting the implementation of federal law at that time. The concept evolved and 
inspired subsequent generations to protect undocumented immigrants, refugees, and 
asylum seekers across the US (Bauder, 2017). For example, in San Francisco advocates 
have interpreted the concept as providing a place where ‘local citizenship’ (as opposed 
to national citizenship) is granted to undocumented refugees and asylum seekers. 
This approach, fostered by local authorities, was characterized by non-cooperation 
and non-compliance with US federal immigration law, which placed restrictions 
considered harmful to refugees (Villazor, 2010). From 1987, San Francisco became 
a ‘city of refuge’ in response to the US federal government’s denial of protection to 
asylum seekers from El Salvador and Guatemala (Villazor, 2010). Two years later the 
city passed an ordinance confirming its non-cooperation and non-involvement with 
federal immigration law, declaring that “no department, agency, commission, offi-
cer or employee of the City and County of San Francisco shall use any city funds or 
resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law” (Villazor, 2010, p. 
583). One way of translating this decision into everyday policies was the ‘don’t ask 
don’t tell’ approach, applied by the local authorities and service providers, which dis-
couraged local stakeholders from inquiring about anyone’s legal migration status and 
revealing it to federal officials (Villazor, 2010). 
As well as upholding the principle of non-cooperation with federal immigration 
law and law-enforcement officials with regard to asylum seekers, the sanctuary city 
concept, as enacted by San Francisco local authorities, contained ideas for challenging 
the formalistic and normative discourse of citizenship and belonging. In its legalistic 
sense, citizenship is a concept that came into being with the rise of the nation-state 
and refers to the “formal or nominal membership in an organized political commu-
nity” (Bosniak, 2000, p. 456). From this perspective, to be a citizen means to possess 
the legal status, acknowledged by the state, of being part of a nation. Holding citizen-
ship is connected with the possession of certain rights and duties, but undocumented 
immigrants not only lack citizenship in their place of residence and, consequently, 
access to certain basic rights, but also often have very few options to ever legalize 
their status without enduring punitive consequences for their presence in that place 
of residence. 
Through San Francisco’s sanctuary law, undocumented immigrants are eligible 
for local citizenship. As citizens of the city, they have equal status with local resi-
dents in terms of rights, privileges, and obligations (Villazor, 2010). In practice, when 
dealing with public sectors such as schools and healthcare services, they will not 
be asked about their immigration status and, if their status is known, it will not be 
revealed to the federal immigration officers. The only exceptions to the law concern 
adult immigrants who have committed crimes and felony. The local citizenship law 
was supported by the issuing of “identification cards to residents regardless of legal 
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status, the promotion of low-cost banking, and the city’s long-standing opposition 
to immigration raids” (Gavin Newsom, Mayor of San Francisco, quoted in Villazor, 
2010, p. 591). 
In 2018, the Federation for American Immigration Reform estimated that more 
than 500 US jurisdictions – both states and municipalities – had adopted sanctuary 
policies. However, many sanctuary cities now face severe repercussions from the fed-
eral government under President Trump and its highly restrictive immigration acts, 
and they have frequently been threatened with cuts in federal funding. Despite the 
threats, a number of sanctuary cities, including Berkeley, have reaffirmed their status 
and commitment as sanctuary cities and promised to protect all residents, regardless 
of their immigration status, by not supporting, communicating with or submitting to 
the demands of federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers.
Hospitality, Engagement, and Reframing the Discourse
The sanctuary city model crossed the Atlantic in the early 2000s to the United 
Kingdom, where the City of Sheffield from 2005 onwards embarked on a popular 
reconceptualization of the concept in a way that continues its “long tradition of 
offering a welcome to refugees” (Wainwright, 2003). As the first city to the Gateway 
Protection Program – a collaborative program between UK national government, 
UNCHR, local authorities, and national NGOs – Sheffield has been actively involved 
in enabling the most vulnerable refugees to gain access to services and participation 
in the wider host community (Darling, 2010). The sanctuary city movement in the 
UK, generally speaking, has been centered on offering hospitality and protection to 
asylum seekers and refugees, and making the city a welcoming place for them. In 
2009, the city council of Sheffield drew up a manifesto outlining key areas of concern, 
and 100 supporting organizations signed on.
According to Darling (2010), the local stakeholders in Sheffield based their 
approach on three main principles, which were translated into various activities. First, 
they aimed to rally political support by establishing a network of civil society agencies 
(academia, local communities, organizations, business, refugee and asylum seekers 
groups), partly to demonstrate the legitimacy of the movement. Second, they sought 
to apply visual strategies to mark the city as a welcoming city for refugees and asylum 
seekers, for example, by providing signs to organizations and local communities that 
declared their support for the sanctuary city movement, by distributing postcards to 
individuals on how they could support refugees and asylum seekers, and develop-
ing infographics that debunked myths about asylum seekers to make people think 
again. Third, they encouraged active engagement between refugees, asylum seekers, 
and local residents through various interactions and events, including cultural events 
such as dancing and concerts, shared meals, and giving honorary awards to citizens in 
recognition of their endeavors to provide to refugees and asylum seekers. 
The main philosophy behind Sheffield’s sanctuary city approach was the strategic 
application of ideas of hospitality and engagement to offer an alternative discourse to 
the public in Sheffield, which was intended to make local residents proud of their cul-
ture of welcoming refugees and asylum seekers but also set out explicit expectations 
for future benefits from the welcomed refugees in order to create a more vibrant host 
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community inclusive of all its residents. Sheffield became the UK’s benchmark which 
led to the establishment of the network of about 15 sanctuary cities in the UK, but the 
outcome of the 2016 referendum in which Britons voted to leave the European Union 
and the anti-immigration sentiment that fueled it now pose difficult challenges for 
advocates of the sanctuary city movement. 
Before moving on to our Indonesian case study, it is necessary to contrast the 
two contending perspectives and practices of sanctuary cities to establish a basis for 
comparison with our case study from Makassar. Generally, the sanctuary city model 
in the UK appears to be more encompassing than the US model, as it seeks to engage 
not only local officials, but also civil society organizations, religious groups, and grass-
roots communities. While the sanctuary city concept in the UK is centered around 
ideas of generosity and engagement and a struggle for abstract justice grounded in 
hospitality, the US model is marked by non-cooperation with federal government 
officials and by the notion of local citizenship, thus envisioning a more “concrete 
political struggle” (Squire & Darling, 2013). Having replaced the notion of asylum 
with sanctuary, UK sanctuary city advocates perceive refugees and asylum seekers 
as guests who deserve a warm welcome, good treatment, and protection, at least for 
a period of time. Critics of this approach have remarked that rather than providing 
tangible and legal solutions for marginalized refugees and illegalized asylum seekers, 
such urban sanctuary initiatives tend to offer only symbolic gestures that actually 
contribute to the normalization of the precarious situation of refugees and asylum 
seekers. In contrast, the spirit of sanctuary cities in the US is rooted in much broader 
debates on the possession of human rights and protection on a permanent basis and 
is, therefore, more than just a friendly welcome and a diffuse expectation towards 
refugees and their contributions to the host communities. Non-cooperation with 
federal government immigration acts and law-enforcement officials and the enact-
ment of the idea of local citizenship signifies equal status and rights for residents and 
immigrants in a city from the very start rather than in the undetermined future and 
without the explicit expectations for benefit in return for the friendly welcome. 
THE ‘LOCAL TURN’ OF REFUGEE MANAGEMENT IN INDONESIA
International migration concerns the movement of people across national state 
boundaries, and, as such, its management, regulation, and supervision are primarily 
the tasks of national governments. At the global level, the paradigm of migration 
management “strives for a coordination of states’ regulatory (inter)-actions to ren-
der international migrations predictable and beneficial for all stakeholders” (Ahouga, 
2018, p. 1524). However, this national-centric migration management has been ques-
tioned in recent years by analysts of both the macro- and micro-politics of migration, 
in large part because international migration affects, first and foremost, sub-national 
governments, which become the actual locus of migration. This view is also reflected 
in the findings of the UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI), which 
say that “the drivers and impact of migration are often most strongly felt at the local 
level”, but at the same time “local governments have not received the same level of 
attention as other stakeholders, while their involvement and potential impact on 
the connections between migration and development is crucial” (JMDI, 2008). The 
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localness of migration effects is felt more strongly, considering that migrants are 
rarely, if ever, equally distributed within national borders. In fact, “immigrants may 
often feel closer and more connected to the city they live in than to the country they 
have arrived in” (Jørgensen, 2012, p. 244).
The importance of local actors in migration management and integration policy 
has been indicated by a number of scholars (Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Jørgensen, 
2012; Penninx, 2009; Schmidtke, 2014). Although urban anthropologists, geog-
raphers, and sociologists have studied urban refugees for at least two decades, 
inter-governmental and supra-national migration organizations, such as JMDI and 
IOM, have only recently shifted their attention to local stakeholders and settings. For 
example, in 2015 IOM convened a Conference on Migrants and Cities, which sought 
to “bring together ministers, high-level government officials, mayors and other local 
authorities, the private sector and civil society organizations to discuss the complex 
dynamics of human mobility at city and local level” (IOM, 2015). This strategic shift, 
often dubbed the local turn in migration management, is a trend that “seeks to engage 
new [local] actors in its endeavour to create coordinated strategies and practices reg-
ulating international migration” (Ahouga, 2018, p. 1524). The unifying theme of this 
local turn is the need to recognize the strong effects of migration on local actors and, 
thus, the important role they can or should play in migration governance.
IOM’s Conference on Migrants and Cities in 2015 also marked the institution’s 
key role in pushing for greater inclusion of actors at the sub-national level. IOM 
claims to provide services “to address the migratory phenomenon from an inte-
gral and holistic perspective . . . in order to maximize its benefits and minimize its 
negative effects” (IOM, 2007, p. 3). As the most prominent proponent of the migra-
tion management paradigm, it claims to serve its member states by promoting and 
implementing “a regulated openness to international migration flow” (Ahouga, 2018, 
p. 1526). However, in the context of the local turn within global migration manage-
ment, IOM plays a key role in engaging “local actors in order to further ‘diffuse’ and 
legitimise migration management’s regulated openness to the local scale through an 
articulation of different space-times” (Ahouga, 2018, p. 1526). 
In Indonesia, which in the three decades before 2000 experienced only the infre-
quent arrival and passage of asylum seekers and refugees through its territory, the state 
had only minimal involvement in regulating and providing services to those people. 
In the absence of any basic legal provision for the treatment of refugees, subsequent 
Indonesian governments preferred to delegate these tasks to the UNHCR and the 
IOM. Much of the funding for these organizations and their programs for refugee sta-
tus determination, resettlement, or repatriation came from the Australian government 
and other international donors (Hirsch & Doig, 2018). Indonesia perceived its role first 
and foremost as ‘transit country’ and was mostly concerned with speedy regular and 
irregular departures from its shores. Given that Indonesia has become a bottleneck for 
asylum seekers and refugees in the last five years, as fewer are resettled and very few 
embark on irregular departures, Indonesia now faces the prolonged presence of these 
people. Rather than approaching this challenge centrally, at the national level sup-
ported by national funds, the current Indonesian government under President Joko 
Widodo aims to shift the challenge down to the next level of government.
In the context of Indonesia, the local turn has been marked by the issuance of 
ASEAS 11(2) | 207
Antje Missbach, Yunizar Adiputera & Atin Prabandari
Presidential Regulation (PR) 125/2016 on the Treatment of Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers in Indonesia, which is now the main legal instrument governing the treat-
ment of refugees in Indonesia. The PR covers five aspects: search and rescue of 
refugees; housing them; securing them; supervising them; and funding of related 
activities (Missbach et al., 2018). Except for search and rescue, which is coordinated 
by national organizations, the four other aspects contain provisions that clearly 
reflect a local turn in Indonesian refugee policy. In this context, local governments 
(pemerintah daerah) are given, to a certain extent, both authority and responsibility 
caring for refugees in their jurisdictions. 
This is not to say that local governments had no role in managing refugees and 
asylum seekers living in their areas before the PR was issued. In fact, the PR can be 
considered as formalizing practices that were already in place in a more informal way. 
Local governments did make policies that affected the lives of refugees in their areas 
and they also worked with central government bodies and international migration 
and refugee organizations before the PR came into force. For example, in Makassar, 
the local government efforts to support handling asylum seekers and refugees and 
their accommodation in alternatives to immigration detention has been acknowl-
edged by the central government as a success (Panga, 2016). Makassar was the first 
city in Indonesia to sign an MoU with IOM. Signed in September 2015, this MoU 
served as a platform for coordination between the municipal government and IOM to 
address issues related to refugees and asylum seekers. Through the MoU, the relevant 
services and work units (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah/SKPD) under the Makassar 
government, such as the local departments of education, healthcare, and social affairs 
are required to provide basic services to refugees and asylum seekers, supported by 
IOM funding (Malia, 2016; Syukri, 2015). The Makassar government has even claimed 
it has produced a blueprint for the management of refugees in Makassar to be used 
elsewhere in Indonesia (IOM, 2016).
So far, the PR is the most important marker of the local turn in Indonesia’s refu-
gee management because it signals a deliberate attempt by policy-makers to turn to 
local actors and position them at the center of Indonesian refugee governance, sup-
ported (but not directed) by national agencies. It assigns formal responsibility to local 
governments and empowers them to use their resources to carry that responsibility. 
On the one hand, this shift of responsibility could be seen as empowering local stake-
holders and giving them a say in the management of refugees rather than just serving 
as “a passive setting for the interventions of international organisations and states” 
(Ahouga, 2018, p. 1524) that often tend to ignore local authorities and local civil soci-
ety organizations. On the other hand, there is the risk that local stakeholders might 
get easily overwhelmed by their new tasks and responsibilities. For example, under 
the PR, local governments, such as the Makassar municipal government, are required 
to identify suitable accommodation for refugees and provide temporary accommo-
dation while they do so. The PR states that the local government should use its own 
assets (land, buildings, etc.) to house refugees. The operational and maintenance 
costs of these assets as they are being used for housing refugees are charged to the 
central government in a loan scheme. The PR lays out strict criteria for the housing, 
which must, for example, be close to healthcare services and religious facilities, be 
within the same municipality as the nearest immigration detention center, and be 
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reliably secure. As for the provision of basic necessities, such as clean water, food, and 
clothing, health and sanitary services, and religious amenities, the PR provides for 
this to be facilitated by international organizations, because funding such requests 
would be far beyond the means of most local governments. This provision in the PR 
means, however, that the housing must also meet quality and safety standards set by 
the international organizations, such as IOM, which tend to be higher than what is 
considered appropriate for local (Indonesian) tenants. Another consequence of the 
PR, however, is that when international organizations are no longer offering financial 
support for refugee-related tasks, local governments are in big trouble.
Under the PR, the local governments now have the authority to use their bud-
get (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah/APBD) for refugee-related program 
expenses. In a series of PR information-sharing events it was made clear that local 
governments can use their APBD to cover the costs of transfer and placement of 
refugees in community housing, of renting temporary accommodation until more 
permanent shelter is available, and even of funerals. These expenses are to be allo-
cated under unforeseen expenses (Belanja Tak Terduga/BTT), and program expenses 
allocated through services and work units (SKPD) under the governor and mayor/
regent. However, spending money on politically unpopular activities, such as pro-
viding for refugees, is something many local leaders are unwilling to do, as it runs 
counter to their political interests and reputation (Missbach et al., 2018).
In sum, the practices, and from 2016 also the legal provisions, of refugee manage-
ment in Indonesia have certainly taken a local turn. Arguably, the central government 
and its agencies still have significant authority over the fate of refugees and asylum 
seekers, but as we have shown, the powers and role given to the local governments 
are equally critical, if not more so, to their welfare as those of the central government. 
Against this backdrop, can a local government use this power and serve as a sanctu-
ary for refugees and asylum seekers coming to Indonesia for prolonged periods of 
time? In order to see what the local turn has meant for asylum seekers and refugees 
in Indonesia we turn to our case study in Makassar in order to consider whether or 
not the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in Makassar resembles either of the 
sanctuary city approaches outlined above in any way. We have structured our delib-
erations and reflections on the potential and challenges of such a possible framing 
loosely around, first, local government involvement in protecting refugees, second, 
local civil society organizations, and third, local host communities. 
OUTSOURCING REFUGEE PROTECTION TO LOCAL ACTORS: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
MAKASSAR
Generally speaking, until early 2018 Makassar had a reputation for being a rather hos-
pitable city for refugees and asylum seekers (“IOM Puji Toleransi di Makassar”, 2016). 
The main reason for this was the openness and welcoming approach by the municipal 
government. Not only had the local city government allowed for the establishment of 
IOM-sponsored community shelters to be used by refugees and asylum seekers who 
were released from immigration detention centres (IDC), but the city government 
was also more supportive of allowing some refugee children to attend local schools 
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(Hafanti, 2018).5 Makassar is still considered a good model for creating community 
shelters and alternatives to detention (ATD) (Missbach, 2017a). It has been success-
ful in placing a good number of refugees outside the local, prison-like immigration 
detention centre, in shelters that meet international quality and safety standards. 
The PR has formalized this role for local government – a role that is strategic and 
crucial for the welfare of refugees. It is probably the role that has the greatest impact 
in current refugee management, as accommodation is tightly connected to the pro-
vision of food, water, health care, education, and spiritual/religious services. In this 
regard, the inclusion of local government in refugee governance under the PR is not 
incidental, but rather a recognition of the vital role that local government can play.
What makes Makassar most attractive to refugees is, however, the relatively quick 
transfer from immigration detention centers to community shelters, which were like 
“paradise” compared to the IDC (IRIN, 2014). Because of its reputation, not only did 
hundreds of asylum seekers move from other Indonesian cities to Makassar where they 
surrendered to immigration authorities to be placed briefly in detention or directly 
in a community shelter (Missbach, 2017a), but detainees in IDCs in other Indonesian 
cities also staged protests and demanded to be transferred to the Makassar IDCs in 
anticipation of prompt transfer to community accommodation (Jonker, 2017). The 
initial hospitality, however, might not suffice to make Makassar resemble a sanctu-
ary city. Makassar’s attractiveness for refugees and asylum seekers, who relocated 
themselves from Jakarta, made the city a victim of its own success. Because of these 
spontaneous arrivals, local migration authorities eventually demanded that new-
comers be stopped (Cipto, 2016). Because fewer asylum seekers have been coming 
to Indonesia since 2015, the number of newcomers to Makassar started to decrease. 
Similar to other Indonesian refugee hubs, Makassar only saw some rudimen-
tary involvement of Indonesian NGOs, such as the faith-based organisation Dompet 
Dhuafa and Palang Merah Indonesia (Indonesian Red Cross) which became involved 
in facilitating some medical services and some recreational activities (Suryono, n.d.). 
Some local NGOs collaborated with the municipal authorities in providing special 
services to underage and unaccompanied minors. However, most of this involvement 
remains rather basic and temporary. There is little long-term engagement or sustain-
ability to be expected any time soon. The specific reasons for this remain unclear. 
Generally speaking, Indonesian civil society organisations have little interest in refu-
gee matters and only very few have dedicated their attention and resources to helping 
refugees stranded in Indonesia (Suaka, 2016). The main exception was the arrival of 
ca. 1,800 Rohingya in Aceh in May 2015, which saw an enormous amount of sponta-
neous donations (Missbach, 2017b).6
Whereas sanctuary cities elsewhere, particularly in the UK, can count on the 
strong support from local civil society organisations and also volunteers, a lot of the 
positive developments for refugees in Makassar can be attributed first and foremost 
5 In most other refugee hubs, refugees organized their own schools as access to state-funded education 
proved very difficult. Learning in Indonesian schools helps the refugee children to learn Bahasa Indonesia 
much faster, which is positive for their local integration.
6 The exemption appeared not least because the Rohingya are a persecuted Muslim minority from 
Myanmar and their destiny struck a chord with Indonesian Muslims who donated generously to readily 
available networks and charities.
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to the city’s mayor, Mohammad Ramdhan ‘Danny’ Pomanto, renowned for his 
friendly outreach to asylum seekers and refugees. For example, on his initiative, the 
local government organized community outreach seminars to inform local inhabit-
ants of Makassar about asylum seekers and refugees (Marzuki, 2016). Asylum seekers 
and refugees were invited to local carnivals and fairs (Alfian, 2017). The relation-
ship between the mayor and some refugees was particularly close, as he offered, for 
example, his private residence for an exhibition of paintings by refugees (Saldy, 2016). 
In return, Mayor Pomanto knew how to play to the gallery by appearing in public 
with young asylum seekers and refugee children who pronounced their gratitude to 
him for their positive treatment in Makassar (Warga Imigran Persembahkan Kado, 
2017). Last but not least, in January 2016, Pomanto received an award for “the sup-
port and collaboration in handling asylum seekers and refugees” from the Indonesian 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kusuma, 2016). Although there have been some 
outstanding individuals in the recent local government who, like Mayor Pomanto, 
have supported the well-being of refugees in Makassar, it is uncertain whether this 
level of support will be maintained under different mayors in the future. Caring for 
refugees serves no voter base, so this budget allocation is a politically unpopular deci-
sion for any mayor. Moreover, the APBD requires approval from the local legislative 
body (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/DPRD), where the politics relating to the 
city’s budget decisions are very contentious. Consequently, it is difficult to expect 
that any meaningful sum of funding will be set aside to care for refugees.
In the past, it was relatively easy for Makassar to emerge as a success story in refu-
gee management, as it did not require the expenditure of any taxpayers’ money. With 
the announcement by the IOM in March 2018 to decrease its funding for refugees 
and the limited range of other international funding sources, the PR puts Makassar 
and the Indonesian government in a difficult position regarding budget allocation. 
The response from the Makassar government and the Indonesian government will 
determine whether taking the local turn is, in fact, a viable option. The latest devel-
opments in Makassar, however, signal an end to the friendly welcome of refugees 
and a more restrictive treatment of them. Despite these aspirations to do away with 
immigration detention for refugees and asylum seekers, the treatment of refugees 
and asylum seekers in Makassar remains imbued with security and surveillance 
motives, even in non-custodial accommodation facilities (Missbach, 2017a).
While the PR generally indicates the local turn by empowering actors at 
sub-national level, in ways consistent with existing practice in Makassar, its imple-
mentation still suffers from an absence of operational guidelines, which makes it 
difficult for the Makassar government to determine the practical steps it must take 
to fulfil the responsibility mandated by the PR. On the one hand, the Makassar city 
government had already gained considerable experience in housing refugees prior 
to the implementation of the PR, which meant that Makassar had no real difficulty 
in carrying out its responsibility as mandated by PR. On the other hand, as techni-
cal and implementation guidance that was to follow the PR’s issuance had not been 
circulated and explained to the city government, local officials were not in a hurry to 
implement the provisions of PR. In mid-February 2018, about two dozen of immigra-
tion officers raided several community shelters in the city of Makassar and arrested 
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several refugees in an unusual show of force.7 The reasons for the raids and arrests 
put forward by local immigration authorities were mostly linked to non-compliance. 
Inhabitants of the shelters must comply with certain rules and regulations to avoid 
being put back into the overcrowded prison-like IDC on Makassar’s outskirts.8 These 
rules range from curfews, the prohibition to drive motorbikes, drink alcohol, or make 
noise at night. As shaky videos captured during the raid on cell phones show, the 
young men were taken from their rooms while other inhabitants watched in fright.9 
Unwilling to accept such conduct, shelter inhabitants across the city staged a peaceful 
protest in front of the local UNHCR office and complained about their arbitrary treat-
ment by local immigration authorities (Freischlad, 2018; Nur, 2018; Padmasari, 2018). 
Peaceful protests continued until September 2018, but with less press coverage.10
At first the local media appeared to be sympathetic to the refugees’ cause and 
pointed to a new head of immigration detention who was testing the boundaries of his 
authority with that of other authorities involved in refugee matters. In order to push 
back against their negative portrayal in the media, local immigration authorities held 
a press conference, in which they blamed refugees for all kinds of moral vices, such 
as drinking alcohol, having affairs with the spouses of police officers living nearby, 
and engaging in same-sex activities and paedophilia (Cipto, 2018; Prayudha, 2018).11 
Although it might sound utterly absurd to many readers, in Indonesia such rumors 
easily fall on fertile ground and create tensions, as a number of anthropologists 
have demonstrated (Bubandt, 2008; Herriman, 2010, 2015). The local government, 
which had done much in support of refugees, remained rather silent throughout 
this tense period, not least because of upcoming local elections that might bring a 
change in local government. Until these arrests, demonstrations, and anti-refugee 
smear campaigns, Makassar was a rather friendly place, but those times might be 
coming to an end sooner than later, not least due to the absent support from the 
Indonesian central government and the decreasing funding from IOM. Whatever 
potential Makassar held to become a sanctuary city, might therefore vanish before it 
ever enfolds properly.
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have shown that over the last years migration management and 
refugee care in Indonesia has indeed seen a local turn, which means that cities and 
regencies now play a greater role in accommodating and managing asylum seekers 
and refugees than in the past, when the central authorities perceived the handling of 
7 The authors were first alerted to these raids in phone calls and Facebook postings by several refugees 
living in some of the shelters.
8 Unfortunately, the rules are often spelled out rather vaguely, leaving plenty of room for immigration 
authorities to exercise discretion (Missbach, 2017a).
9 One such video went viral on social media, see https://m.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v= 
YakmTzFQeaY. 
10 Indonesian filmmaker Andrianus ‘Oetjoe’ Merdhi captured some of the protests in his recent docu-
mentary Respite, see http://amerdhi.mengoceh.de/respite-trailer2018/
11 For the full press conference, see https://video.okezon e.com/play/2018/02/22/1/109444/waduh-imi 
gran-di-sulsel-kerap -mengganggu-istri-aparat
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asylum seekers and refugees their exclusive task. We have argued that this local turn 
was an essential reaction to the failure of creating a regional protection mechanism 
that would provide a more concerted way of dealing with incoming asylum seekers 
within the region based on the existing regional legal frameworks, such as the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration (Gleeson, 2017). Furthermore, we have reasoned that this 
local turn in Indonesia – although set in motion informally prior to the issuance of 
the PR – was eventually formalised through the decree. Unwilling to create a compre-
hensive protection framework for asylum seekers and refugees on the national level 
and provide the necessary funds to run it, the Indonesian central government has 
sought to shift the responsibility to sub-national levels, first and foremost regencies 
and municipalities. Indonesian cities became a locus of sanctuary, but – judged on 
the criteria for what constitutes the best practice cases for sanctuary cities elsewhere 
– they fall short of meeting any of those.  
There is a fine distinction between the local turn of refugee care and the concept 
of sanctuary city. While the former has only been emerging in the last decade or so, 
the latter has been around since at least the 1970s. Local turn is a set of efforts under-
taken by international and national actors to include local actors in the management 
of international migration. The goal of this inclusion is to create better policies and 
practices in regulating migration, considering that local actors are the ones affected 
the most by it. As such, it is clear that the local turn lacks normative orientation as to 
what kinds of ‘regulation’ it wants to pursue. The concept of sanctuary city, on the 
other hand, clearly has normative goals, i.e. protection from deportation, hospitality, 
engagement, and social inclusion. It advocates a certain ‘kind’ of regulations that aim 
for a better treatment of migrants.
While both have different goals in mind, it does not necessarily mean that both are 
mutually exclusive. Empowering local actors in migration governance should prima 
facie support the establishment of sanctuary cities, if not its pre-requisite. There are, 
however, aspects of the local turn that may hinder the goals of sanctuary city. The 
local turn as a phenomenon in migration management and refugee care is usually 
characterized by a top-down approach, where actors at the international and national 
level ‘ask’ sub-national governments to be more proactive in migration governance. 
This puts sub-national governments as passive recipients of responsibility that spill 
over from the top. As such, the hierarchical nature of this relationship may remain, 
hindering meaningful policy initiatives from below. Another aspect of local turn that 
may contradict sanctuary city is the prominence of local state actors over local non-
state actors, particularly the civil society. As the case of UK has shown, civil society 
activism is the key driver for sanctuary city. Whether the local turn can meaningfully 
empower civil society as an important local actor for refugee care remains to be seen.
Nowadays, the majority of asylum seekers and refugees is living in Indonesian 
cities and their surroundings. Initially it was only Jakarta, where the UNHCR has 
its main office, but later on also other big Indonesian cities – such as Makassar, 
Medan, and Surabaya –  started to attract asylum seekers and refugees. So, it is fair to 
say that Indonesia’s refugee population has predominantly been an urban one. Yet, 
cities in Indonesia have not displayed the same welcoming reception or the auton-
omous sanctuary in the same way as what sanctuary cities have been well-known 
for in the US or in the UK, which remain somewhat consistent despite the growing 
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anti-immigration sentiment in recent years and the rise of President Donald Trump 
who is openly hostile towards sanctuary cities. Whereas sanctuary cities elsewhere 
were primarily an emancipatory act against the discriminating federal migration 
laws or the hostile state more generally – driven by local activists and progressive 
local stakeholders – in Indonesia the appointment of cities as responsible units was 
ordered by the central government. This top-down instruction that saw very little 
consultation of local stakeholders vis-à-vis the more organically grown bottom-up 
initiatives, particularly in the UK, thus draw a number of consequences in what cit-
ies in Indonesia can actually offer refugees and asylum seekers residing there. For a 
final conclusion on the consequences of the local turn in migration management 
and refugee care in Indonesia (as currently implemented through the PR), we need to 
continue our close observations of the situation and the upcoming developments on 
the ground in Makassar and elsewhere in Indonesia.

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